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GRENFELL PHASE 2 REPORT: IMPACT ON PRODUCT MANUFACTURERS

November 2024

This impact note focuses on the key findings detailed in Phase 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, specifically concerning product manufacturers and the insulation products installed on the Grenfell Tower.

The Phase 2 Report was published on 4 September 2024, and in considerable length outlines the circumstances and causes of the fire. Our earlier article outlines the main findings.

The Report’s Findings:

Concerning the testing and marketing of products used at the Grenfell Tower, the Report notes that:

• A very significant reason why Grenfell Tower was clad in combustible materials was due to systematic dishonesty by those manufacturing and supplying rainscreen cladding panels and insulation products. Such entities engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate testing, misrepresent test data and mislead the market.

• There was a general presumption that the regulatory and testing regimes were working effectively. However:

–  There were misunderstandings concerning the classification and use of certain products within the wider construction industry

– The certification bodies providing assurance to the market on the products’ quality and characteristics, for example the British Board of Agrément (“BBA”) and Local Authority Building Control (“LABC”), failed to ensure that the product certificates or statements were accurate and based upon test evidence. Further, UKAS, overseeing the certification bodies, also failed to adequately monitor or supervise processes[1].

– The use of certain products on a building of this nature contributed to the rapid spread of the fire.

Kingspan[2]:

• The story of the development and marketing of the K15 product for use on buildings of over 18m between 2006-2019 is one of deeply entrenched and persistent dishonesty on the part of Kingspan in pursuit of commercial gain, coupled with a complete disregard for fire safety. Importantly, Kingspan knew that K15 was not suitable for use on buildings over 18m. However, it chose to disregard that fact when selling K15 and advising on its use.  This dishonesty created a spurious market for a polymeric insulation product suitable for use on high-rise buildings generally.
• In the period between 2005 and 14 June 2017, two important claims were made by Kingspan in relation to the fire performance of K15:

– K15 had achieved a classification of Class 0 through testing to Parts 6 and 7 of BS 476.

– K15 had been tested to BS 8414 and had met the criteria in BR135.

• In marketing K15, Kingspan therefore relied on a single BS 8414-1 test performed in 2005 on a system whose components were not representative of a typical external wall.
• In 2006, Kingspan introduced a new technology K15. Despite this, they continued to make the above two claims about the product’s fire performance without any reference to the changes that had been made to the product’s composition. These claims appeared in Kingspan’s marketing literature, its correspondence with customers and in certificates published by the BBA and LABC.
• However, in relation to the new technology K15 those claims were entirely false. No test in accordance with BS 8414 had been carried out on a system incorporating new technology K15 (this was not done until March 2015) and no classification in accordance with the criteria in BR135 had been made (or was made until June 2015).  Moreover, new technology K15 did not achieve results to justify a rating of Class 0 at any stage before the Grenfell Tower fire.
• Kingspan carried out tests on the new technology K15. However, none of these brought positive news about the product’s fire performance. Instead, Kingspan marketed and sold K15 relying heavily on tests which had been carried out on a different product and which had included a non-combustible cement particle board as the rainscreen. This was done deliberately. It did not withdraw the then current K15 product from the market despite concerns. Instead Kingspan continued to sell K15 to an unsuspecting market without interruption or warning while hoping that a positive test result might turn up.
• Kingspan’s dishonesty was facilitated, albeit inadvertently, by serious incompetence on the part of two bodies, the BBA and LABC, to which the industry looked for confirmation that K15 was suitable for use on buildings over 18m. Both those bodies compromised their independence by entering into discussions or negotiations with Kingspan over the wording of their certificates and agreeing to include language that was inappropriate and misleading. For example, on the re-issue of BBA’s certificate in 2013, Kingspan persuaded BBA to include a statement that K15 complied with Approved Document B paragraph 12.7, wrongly implying it had limited combustibility. Both bodies failed to examine rigorously the material on which Kingspan’s applications were based.
• Further, by April 2010, the National House Building Council (“NHBC”) had awareness that combustible insulation was being used much more commonly in external walls of buildings over 18m – particularly K15. Despite this, it had been NHBC’s practice until 2015 to allow the use of K15 on buildings over 18m on the basis of the BBA certificate.  NHBC’s approach of relying uncritically on what Kingspan itself claimed for K15 demonstrated weakness and a failure to live up to its responsibilities.
• According to the Report, the sale of K15 for use on buildings over 18m continued until October 2020. Kingspan exploited the industry’s lack of knowledge on BS 8414/BR 135. It understood the market was likely to rely on its product claims, not least since the BBA’s certificate directed buyer to consult Kingspan[3].

Celotex[4]:

• Celotex considered it was losing business to Kingspan as it did not have a product that was suitable for use on buildings over 18m. It decided that if copying Kingspan was the only way of obtaining a test result that would enable it to market a product as suitable for over 18m, it would act accordingly.   Specifically, the Report notes that to break into this market “Celotex embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market.”[5]
• This led to the launch of Celotex RS5000 in August 2014. RS5000 was the insulation product that was mainly used in the cladding system at Grenfell Tower.  RS5000 was said by Celotex to have been tested in accordance with BS 8414 in May 2014 and to have met the criteria in BR135, thereby conforming to the guidance contained in paragraph 12.5 of ADB.  RS5000 was marketed by Celotex as “the first PIR board to successfully test to BS 8414”, and as “acceptable for use in buildings above 18 metres in height”[6].
• However, the test on which Celotex relied as support for that claim had been rigged by the inclusion of fire-resistant magnesium oxide boards. Celotex concealed the fact that the test had been manipulated in this way in its marketing.
• The marketing literature for RS5000 contained two messages, both of which were false and deliberately misleading. The first, aimed at the designer who did not read beyond the first page, was that RS5000 was suitable for use on any building over 18m, whereas it was not. The second was the warning aimed at the more conscientious reader that the fire performance and classification for RS5000 related only to the components described as making up the system tested, when in fact the components were misdescribed.
• Moreover, BS 8414 and BR135 did not provide for the classification of individual products; they applied only to a complete system, which, if it met the criteria in BR135, could be regarded as suitable for use in buildings over 18m. Celotex deliberately tucked that information away in the small print of its marketing literature where it was unlikely to be spotted.
• There was a suggestion that Celotex classified its customers based on their technical sophistication[7].
• The Building Research Establishment (“BRE”) had knowledge of the approach taken to testing by Celotex and produced a report which deliberately omitted crucial reference to the fire-resistant magnesium oxide boards. BRE knew that referring to the presence of those boards would significantly undermine the commercial viability of the product. This approach by BRE highlights that, over the years leading up to 2014, BRE had lost sight of the importance of maintaining a proper distance between itself and clients and of the need for scientific rigour and independence. It appears that some BRE staff had advised customers (such as Kingspan and Celotex) on how to satisfy the criterion for a system to be seemed safe, thus compromising its integrity and independence.
• The first LABC certificate for RS5000 was issued on 21 August 2014 and gave an untrue and misleading impression that RS5000 was suitable for use on buildings over 18m in height generally. When preparing its certificate, LABC’s approach was fundamentally flawed in that it accepted misleading and/or incorrect statements made by Celotex without undertaking sufficient investigations and inspecting the necessary classification reports.

Arconic Architectural Products[8]:

• Arconic Architectural Products (“Arconic”) manufactured and sold the Reynobond 55 PE rainscreen (ACM) panels used in the refurbishment project.
• Polyethylene burns fiercely and is dangerous when the product is used in cassette form. From early 2005 until after the fire, Arconic deliberately concealed the true extent of the dangers of this product from the market. It held test data showing that in its cassette form the product reacted dangerously to fire and could not be classified in line with European standards. However, Arconic told the market the panels were classed B-s2, d0 without drawing any distinction between the cassette form and riveted form.
• By late 2007 however, Arconic was aware of serious concerns in the construction industry about the safety of ACM panels. By the summer of 2011, Arconic was also aware that Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form performed worse in a fire, and was considerably more dangerous than in a riveted form, however it continued to exploit weak regulatory regimes in certain countries (including in the UK). For example, Arconic did not withdraw Reynobond 55 PE despite knowledge from cladding fires in Dubai during 2012-2013 – instead it allowed UK customers to continue purchasing the unmodified product.
• Following further testing in 2013, Arconic certified Reynobond 55 PE as Class E regardless of the form but did not pass that information on to UK customers or to the BBA. This was subsequently viewed as a deliberate strategy to continue product sale with a false fire performance statement. Further in December 2014, the French testing house, Centre Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment, classified the panels in riveted form as Class C and in cassette form as Class E. However, Arconic failed to inform the BBA.
• Although Reynobond 55 PE required fabrication and could not be used in its factory form, Arconic persuaded BBA to issue a certificate without any distinction on the different fixing forms. In summary, it concealed key information, including test data, and caused the BBA to make statements in the certificate that Arconic knew were false and misleading.

Siderise[9]:

• The Report briefly mentions the manufacturer of the Lamatherm cavity barriers used for the refurbishment.
• The suggestion is that there was no evidence of dishonesty. However, the Report notes that some aspects of Siderise’s marketing materials raised concern.
• Further, Siderise supplied cavity barriers for use in voids larger than those for which they were tested.

Relevant Recommendations[10]:

The Report makes the following key recommendations relevant for product manufacturers:

• The Government to draw together under a single regulator (“the construction regulator”) key functions relating to the construction industry, including (inter alia):

– the regulation of construction products;

– the development of suitable methods for testing the reaction to fire of materials and products intended for use in construction;

– the testing and certification of such products; and

– the issue of certificates of compliance of construction products with the requirements of legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards.

• Steps be taken to develop new test methods that will provide the information needed for such assessments to be carried out reliably.
• BS 9414 (which offers guidance on the interpretation of BS 8414 test data and provides procedures and rules for the way in which such data can be extended to other systems) should be approached with caution and the government should make it clear that it should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer.
• The construction regulator should be responsible for assessing the conformity of construction products with the requirements of legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards and issuing certificates as appropriate.
• To improve clarity regarding these certificates, it is recommended that:

– copies of all test results supporting any certificate issued by the construction regulator be included in the certificate;

– manufacturers be required to provide the construction regulator with the full testing history of the product or material and inform the regulator of any material circumstances that may affect its performance; and

– manufacturers be required by law to provide on request copies of all test results that support claims about fire performance made for their products.

• The construction regulator to sponsor the development of a library to provide a continuing resource for designers. This would include information such as test data on products and materials, reports on serious fires, and academic papers.

Concluding Remarks:

The Report makes clear that those responsible for designing buildings must have access to reliable information on materials or products. However, as summarised above, the Report identifies a culture of dishonesty by the product manufacturers, Kingspan and Celotex, for the purpose of commercial gain, including fraudulent and misrepresentative testing, misleading literature and deliberate omissions and/or untrue statements being made to certification bodies.

These manufacturers were able to use misleading marketing in part because certification bodies failed to ensure that the statements made in their certificates were accurate and were based on appropriate and relevant test evidence.

Notwithstanding these failures, the Report identifies that this does not absolve the professional team on Grenfell Tower from fault.  The design team were also to blame for specifying insulation products without properly analysing the regulations and without considering how the insulation product(s) would operate within the external wall system as a whole.

In addition, changes to overhaul regulation aspects of the construction industry have already been commenced, including the creation of the Office for Product Safety and Standards and appointment of a National Regulator for Construction Products, however the Report and other construction industry reviews suggest that further action is required regarding the manufacturing, testing and supply of products in the UK. Notably, the Report disagreed that the appointment of a National Regulator of Construction Products would resolve some of the problems identified, not least since the current system depends upon the effective conformity of assessment bodies and limited UKAS oversight.

Please visit our website to find out more about key legal developments in building safety. If you require support on any of the issues raised by the Report or its recommendations, please contact us.

[1] Phase 2 Report, Volume 1, Part 1 (Chapter 2 – Executive Summary), paragraph 2.19

[2] Phase 2 Report, Volume 2, Part 3 (Chapters 22-23)

[3] Phase 2 Report, Volume 1, Part 1 (Chapter 2), paragraphs 2.32-2.39

[4] Phase 2 Report, Volume 2, Part 3 (Chapters 24-25)

[5] Phase 2 Report, Volume 1, Part 1  (Chapter 2), paragraph 2.28

[6] Phase 2 Report, Volume 1,, Part 1 (Chapter 2), paragraph 2.30

[7] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4, Part 6 (Chapter 56), paragraphs 56.116 – 56.125

[8] Phase 2 Report, Volume 1, Part 1 (Chapter 2), paragraphs 2.21 – 2.27

[9] Phase 2 Report, Volume 1, Part 1 (Chapter 2), paragraph 2.40

[10] Phase 2 Report, Volume 7, Part 14 (Chapter 113)

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