Download PDF

GRENFELL PHASE 2 REPORT: IMPACT ON FIRE ENGINEERS

October 2024

This impact note focuses on the findings detailed in Phase 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, specifically concerning the appointed specialist fire engineer. It also explores the recommendations that will impact fire engineers and the wider construction industry going forward.

The Phase 2 Report was  published on 4 September 2024, and in considerable length outlines the circumstances and causes of the fire. Our earlier article outlines the main findings.

The Report’s Findings

The key findings involving the fire engineer are as follows:

• The fire strategy engineer was partly responsible for the refurbished building being in a dangerous condition[1]. Major criticisms concern significant omissions from the documentation it produced and its overall conduct (see below).
• Designing safe buildings requires skill acquired via specialised education and experience worthy of formal recognition. ‘Fire engineer’ does not presently denote or necessitate any formal qualification. Not all those professing to be fire engineers are capable of competently performing that role.
• Volume 4 of the Report references the role of a fire engineer and the nature and purpose of a fire safety strategy[2]. In particular:

– According to the Institution of Fire Engineers, fire engineering is ““the application of scientific and engineering principles, rules, and expert judgment, based on an understanding of the phenomena and effects of fire and the reaction and behaviour of people to fire, to protect people, property and the environment from the destructive effects of fire”.

– Further, a ‘fire engineer’ is a person who “through education, training and experience” understands, amongst other things, the “nature, characteristics and mechanisms of fire, the spread and control of fire” and “the likely behaviour of materials, structures, machines, apparatus and processes as related to the protection of life, property and the environment from fire”.

– A reasonably competent fire engineer ought, as a minimum, to have a sound understanding of these matters.

• Other roles on the refurbishment project impacted the performance of the fire engineer, including:

– Poor briefing on the project and a general lack of interest in the fire engineer’s work.

– The principal contractor not taking them on (or asking questions, as noted elsewhere in the Report).

– The architect not providing the requisite information (or asking appropriate questions).

– The Employer’s Agent not considering contractual responsibilities or picking up that the work was incomplete.

– The client’s “regrettable lack of interest in fire safety and a casual attitude to its responsibilities… it is in particular, astonishing that none of the other professionals appear to have realised or warned… work on the Outline Strategy was incomplete in relation to the compliance of the external wall with functional requirement B4”[3].

Nonetheless, this did not exonerate the fire engineer – its involvement on the project gave the client and design team “a false sense of security” that fire safety matters were properly addressed.

• Other construction professionals and senior members of emergency services require a basic understanding of fire engineering principles in the built environment context. Further, effective input from a fire engineer could have alerted the parties to the risks and the dangers of using certain products.
• The investigation into the failings surrounding the Grenfell Tower highlight an industry-wide failure to properly investigate or understand the nature of the materials being selected, which is evidenced by findings of similar materials on hundreds of high-rise buildings.

Whilst the Inquiry is not supposed to make liability findings, it considered “work on the Existing Fire Safety Strategy fell well below the standards to be expected of a reasonably competent fire engineer”[4] and did not comply with statutory requirements or guidance. For example, the fire engineer failed “to identify the significant fire safety risks introduced by the refurbishment”[5] and it:

• Held itself out as a specialist market leader in the field of fire safety services, yet failed to use appropriately qualified and experienced personnel (with awareness and training). A company presenting itself as providing high quality fire engineering services ought to ensure its work is approved by a qualified Chartered Fire Engineer (with the minimum training required by the Engineering Council).
• Failed to understand the scope of the instructions and prepared an inadequate fee proposal.
• Failed to clarify its contractual position and role following the appointment of the principal contractor.
• Took an insufficiently narrow or ‘blinkered’ approach to the task and certain ad hoc advice sought.
• Failed to read Approved Document B in full. This was despite an awareness (1) that this contained warnings around the use of combustible materials in cladding and on the health and safety risks of extensive cavities in tall buildings; and (2) of serious fires in the UK and overseas due to use of inappropriate materials.
• Failed to produce accurate and complete fire strategy documentation and relied on this being marked ‘outline’ or ‘draft’ or it being reviewed by others involved with the project or building control.
• Had insufficient information and had not visited the Tower when completing the fire safety strategy; a site visit was only completed by an individual at a preliminary stage (who had left the company).
• Failed to request the necessary documentation required to inform the strategy and final report.
• Used incorrect assumptions and failed to make appropriate enquiries when providing its opinion/inputs.
• Failed to produce a final fire safety strategy – this was the advice it was contracted to provide.
• Failed to draw issues or non-compliances, and the incomplete nature of the report, to the design team’s attention, or warn of potential consequences in relying upon this. The document produced was poor and incomplete – it failed to record the condition of Grenfell Tower and did not provide a reliable baseline for the creation of a fire safety strategy for the refurbishment.
• Failed to communicate serious concerns or issues directly to the client.
• Adopted an approach deemed inconsistent with the regulatory requirements and the careful approach to safety matters and standards to be expected of a reasonably competent fire engineer.
• Failed to consider relevant industry/technical guidance and news, regulatory requirements, and examples of other fires in the UK and overseas. For example, for residential buildings, fire safety primarily concerns the protection and preservation of life. An effective fire safety strategy calls for high standards of skill, knowledge and professional experience and fulfil several purposes, i.e. it should:

1. address each of the Functional Requirements (B1-B5) of the Building Regulations for fire.
2. provide narrative on the fire safety objectives and how these are to be met (including by active and passive fire safety systems).
3. describe the building’s characteristics and occupants, including construction details, fire systems, and the reasons for providing these.
4. explain how the building is to be managed to protect persons using it from fire and identify any fire risks which have either been mitigated or which it is not possible to mitigate.
5. be written to provide those managing and occupying the building with a clear understanding about the fire protection and prevention measures, how to maintain these, and how to educate people on what to do in the event of fire. It should also be easily understood by the emergency services.
6. identify the fire safety performance requirements for the design of fire safety systems.

• Failed to provide a fire safety strategy addressing design questions concerning fire safety, including “surface spread of flame requirements for surface materials”, “fire compartmentation requirements, including fire-stopping and cavity barriers” and “external fire spread”[6].
• Did not absorb industry information, open the product datasheet, or obtain colleagues’ specialist advice on the materials (and their reaction to fire), and so were not alerted to the risks involved. However, available industry knowledge included knowledge of international fires; the third edition of BR135, published in 2013; and the BCA Technical Guidance Note 18, dated June 2014.
• Failed to identify the nature of the proposed rainscreen product, and its combustible nature, or the unsuitability of the combustible insulation and window infill panels (or liaise with colleagues on this).
• Failed to spot the absence of cavity barriers in key locations.
• Failed to align its fire strategy report with the RIBA Stages and the reports of the architect and mechanical & electrical engineer (albeit no mention of structural engineer). However, any “reasonably competent fire engineer would know it necessary to read them in full, or at least to review them and digest all aspects… relevant to fire safety”[7].
• Produced a Design Note which did not identify the information relied upon or provide a sufficient level of detail.
• Issued an Outline Fire Strategy which did not provide the design team with the information they needed to ensure that when the refurbishment had been completed the building would be safe for occupation.
• Did not discuss (or record) whether the cladding proposals complied with Approved Document B.
• Adopted an attitude of hoping that building control would review the documents or not notice a breach of the Building Regulations. Deviations from statutory guidance should have been identified (even in a generic sense) so that different readers could consider these when making project decisions. Further the Inquiry Panel rejected submissions that:

– information was lacking or not required because others on the project would have known or covered these points.

– none of the reports were issued as ‘final’ – this did not exonerate failures to include such advice.

• Generally failed to comply with its own internal procedure when producing the draft documents and had a general lack of ownership regarding the project. The peer reviewer’s approach was high-level and inadequate for a number of reasons and based on incorrect assumptions or trust.
• Adopted an approach “which concentrates more on obtaining building control approval than on ensuring people’s safety”[8]. This conduct was observed in others working on the refurbishment project.
• Overlooked inclusive design guidance and measures to accommodate the occupants’ needs, including when defining the strategy for evacuating the building or locating a place of safety.

Relevant Recommendations[9]:

Given the findings of the Inquiry, the Report makes the following recommendations for fire engineers. The:

• Creation of a formal professional fire engineering body with regulation, including legal protection of the title, and greater regulation of qualifications and conduct.
• Acceleration of an objective authoritative statement of the skills a fire engineer should possess from a practical, scientific, and intellectual perspective to improve competence and communication on projects.
• High-quality fire engineering courses to improve competence and promote effective communication.
• Encouragement of the development of continuing professional development courses in fire engineering for construction professionals and members of the emergency services.
• Use of a mandatory accreditation system for fire risk assessors.
• Introduction of new requirements for documentation or calculations by a registered fire engineer. Fire safety strategy to be submitted with building control applications for the construction or refurbishment of HRBs (Gateway 2) and reviewed at completion (Gateway 3).
• Suggestion that BS 9414 is approached with caution – recommends government clearly indicate that it should not be used as a substitute for an appropriate assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer.
• Clarification and revision of relevant Approved Documents and statutory guidance, with appropriate review from those with practical industry experience chosen for experience and skill (i.e. fire engineers).

Other wider recommendations in the Report that will impact fire engineers include:

• Establishment of a single construction regulator to oversee and inform all aspects of the industry.
• Use of a Chief Construction Adviser with good working knowledge and practical industry experience.
• Review of legal landscape (including potential widening of the Higher Risk Buildings (“HRB”) definition).
• Creation of a construction library with key information including product and test data.

Concluding Remarks:

Overall, the Report identifies that earlier reforms within the construction industry are positive but don’t sufficiently ensure that buildings are designed, built, and maintained safely. Further regulation and training are required across the industry to guarantee that buildings and fire safety remain a priority.

You can find out more about building safety via our website. If you require support on any of the issues raised by the Report or its recommendations, please contact us.

[1] Phase 2 Report, Volume 1, Part 1 (Executive Summary), paragraphs 2.77-2.83 and Volume 4 (Chapter 54)

[2] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4 (Chapter 54), paragraph 54.7

[3] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4 (Chapter 54), paragraphs 54.163 and 54.164

[4] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4 (Chapter 54), paragraph 54.46

[5] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4 (Chapter 54), overall conclusion on Exova

[6] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4 (Chapter 54), paragraph 54.9

[7] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4 (Chapter 54), paragraph 54.10

[8] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4 (Chapter 54), paragraph 54.47-54.53

[9] Phase 2 Report, Volume 7 (Part 14)

Download PDF