GRENFELL PHASE 2 REPORT: IMPACT ON BUILDING CONTROL PROFESSIONALS

This impact note focuses on the findings detailed in Phase 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, specifically concerning the Local Authority Building Control, and RBKC building control (as the relevant building control authority). It also explores the recommendations that will impact building control processes, approvals and the profession, as well as the wider construction industry going forward.

The Phase 2 Report was published on 4 September 2024, and in considerable length outlines the circumstances and causes of the fire. Our earlier article outlines the main findings.

The Report’s Findings[1]:

To summarise, the key findings in the Report involving building control include the following points:

• The government has already taken steps to overhaul regulation of aspects of the construction industry, for example by prohibiting use of certain materials; introducing new building control approval requirements for the construction and refurbishment of higher-risk buildings (HRBs); building control function reform; and introducing measures to improve competence. This should continue, nonetheless the Report concludes “there are some important areas in which improvements need to be made and others in which the action taken by the government does not go far enough”[2].
• The Report notes that the requirement to obtain building control approval for the refurbishment should have ensured that any errors in design or the choice of materials were identified and put right before the work started but that did not happen. Given the importance of building control for the protection of the public, the Inquiry examined in some depth the reasons why the system failed to achieve the purpose for which it was designed[3].
• Historically, building control partly fell to local authorities and partly to approved inspectors (operating as private or commercial organisations). Other approaches to regulation were also seen as fragmented and the Report considered this “was a recipe for inefficiency and an obstacle to effective regulation”[4].
• Many involved in major construction projects previously regarded building control as a source of advice or assistance (i.e. described as an extension of the design team). However, the Report indicates that change is required in this regard.
• The Local Authority Building Control (LABC), the membership organisation created to support local authority building control departments in England and Wales, wrongly issued certificates verifying compliance of construction products and systems with the Building Regulations and Approved Documents. There were systematic failures over several years of the LABC to ensure that the certificates were technically accurate and based upon test evidence. The LABC’s certificates also contained misleading statements, including statements on fire performance and use for HRBs.
• The most serious errors made by LABC were the failure to recognise that the ACM panels used were highly combustible and the failure to recognise that insulation used was not of limited combustibility. It also compromised its independence and negotiated with product manufacturers on the wording of certificates.
• LABC was vulnerable to manipulation since its processes were not rigorously implemented. Building control officers had insufficient knowledge or experience to make informed product assessments.
• The National House Building Council (NHBC) employed Approved Inspectors for building control services and influenced industry via the Building Control Alliance. However, the NHBC failed to ensure its building control function remained free from commercial interests or pressures, preventing a system that effectively served the public interest. Competition for work and with local authority building control departments had introduced a similar conflict of interest and continues to threaten the integrity of the system.
• The RBKC (council and owner of the building) was jointly responsible for the management of fire safety at Grenfell Tower, together with the Tenant Management Organisation.
• The Department of Building Control at RBKC acted as building control authority, conducting inspection visits between August 2014 and July 2016. According to the evidence, RBKC building control could be difficult to deal with, particularly when presented with something that did not comply exactly with official guidance.
• Further, RBKC building control failed to properly scrutinise the design or choice of materials and to satisfy itself that the completed work would comply with Building Regulations requirements as part of its statutory role and services (although criticisms were also made of the architect in providing the necessary information to discharge this function). The tension between local authority and private building control inspectors was noted during earlier stages of the Inquiry.
• Other evidence suggested that the parties were attempting to get the design via building control processes, e.g. the fire engineer. The adopted approach was criticised but widespread within industry and had concentrated more on obtaining building control approval than on ensuring people’s safety[5].
• Record keeping – RBKC building control’s policy of ‘weeding’ old documents meant contemporaneous records were incomplete (e.g. surveyor notes had been destroyed), which was unsatisfactory. Full records of projects must be retained. RBKC building control alleged that it included a condition on its approval of the full plans application that the façade comply with Section 12 of Approved Document B. This was not recorded in writing nor kept on file, which is a “very serious omission”[6].
• Full plans application – drawings were submitted incomplete, and not demonstrating compliance with functional requirements of B1 to B5 of the Building Regulations. The application should therefore have been rejected. The officer’s justification for not rejecting the application was that it was trying to ‘work with’ the applicant. This shows a misunderstanding that the building control’s function is to robustly enforce building regulations for the benefit of the public or community at large, rather than serve and accommodate applicants.
• The building control officer failed to identify and obtain basic missing information, did not carry out a methodical review of documents and failed to notice obvious errors and inconsistencies in drawings.
• No formal decision notice was issued. This shows a lack of care and disregard to procedural requirements.
• Examination of materials – the building control officer did not properly check the certificates for construction products, was not aware of advice in Approved Document B that test evidence should be checked carefully, and did not consider himself to be qualified or required to interpret test evidence. The Report criticises this and states that building control officers can be expected to examine certificates to ascertain whether materials are suitable for the use they are intended for. It was not enough to accept manufacturers’ assurances at face value nor assume the design and construction team had checked suitability of materials.
• Site visits – The RBKC building control officer intended to visit site once a month but in fact visited much less often, and during visits failed to complete necessary checks (e.g. the officer did not check windows to see whether cavity barriers were installed) which he accepted was a failure. The Report states that he should have visited site more often to complete careful and detailed inspections.
• Regulation 38 – RBKC building control informally asked the principal contractor to confirm that it had provided necessary fire safety information to the Responsible Person for the purposes of the Fire Safety Order. This is unacceptable practice, and independent steps must be taken to show that the necessary information has been passed on.
• Completion certificate – the external wall was not compliant with the functional requirement B4 of the Building Regulations, yet a completion certificate was issued by RBKC when it should not have been.
• Organisational issues – The relevant building control officer had no experience of high-rise residential projects and had poor knowledge of the building regulations relating to cladding. He was undertrained and lacked requisite skills. Workloads were too high, so he was overstretched.
• A building control body should provide continuing professional development for its officers, as reflected in Building Control Performance Standards.

Relevant recommendations[7]:

Given the findings of the Inquiry, the Report makes the following relevant recommendations.

• Greater building control regulation and oversight generally.
• Creation of an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process. The same panel is to also consider whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority.
• The current regulatory framework and bodies are fragmented and there should now be a single regulatory body with overarching responsibility. This shall include, among other things, the regulation and oversight of building control, and conformity of construction products with legislation, guidance and standards.
• Introduction of new statutory requirements on information to be created and submitted with building control applications (Gateway 2) for the construction or refurbishment of any HRB and reviewed/re-submitted at completion (Gateway 3) – i.e. a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer and documents or statements from the principal designer and principal contractor.

Other wider recommendations in the Report that may impact building control officers or professionals:

• Approved Document B is insufficient in its current form. Statutory guidance and Approved Document B in particular are to be reviewed, and a revised version published, as soon as possible.
• Guidance should be revised to contain clear warnings that legal requirements are contained in the Building Regulations and compliance with guidance will not necessarily result in compliance with them.
• There should be a licensing scheme for contractors wishing to construct/refurbish higher risk buildings and a legal requirement that any application for building control approval to be supported by a personal undertaking to take all reasonable care to ensure the building is safe as required by building regulations.
• Encouragement of the development of continuing professional development courses in fire engineering for construction professionals and members of the emergency services.

Concluding remarks

Overall, the Report identifies that earlier reforms within the construction industry are positive but insufficient to ensure that buildings are designed, built, and maintained safely. Further regulation and training are required across the construction industry to ensure that buildings and fire safety remain a priority.

Please visit our website to find out more about key legal developments in building safety. If you require support on any of the issues raised by the Report or its recommendations, please contact us

[1] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4, Part 6

[2] Phase 2 Report, Volume 1, Part 1 (Chapter 1 – Introduction), paragraph 1.17

[3] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4, Part 6 (Chapter 47), paragraph 47.6

[4] Phase 2 Report, Volume 7, Part 14 (Chapter 113), paragraph 113.4

[5] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4, Part 6 (Chapter 54), paragraph 54.53

[6] Phase 2 Report, Volume 4, Part 6 (Chapter 54), paragraph 62.25

[7] Phase 2 Report, Volume 7, Part 14 (Chapter 113)