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EU DMA and UK DMCCA: A Comparison

May 2026

Digital markets have come under increased regulatory scrutiny in recent years, and traditional competition law has struggled to keep pace with the power of large online platforms. In response, the EU and the UK have introduced dedicated new regimes: the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA).

Although these regimes may appear relevant only to the largest technology companies, their impact is likely to be felt much more widely. Businesses across sectors rely on digital platforms for marketing, distribution and access to customers. For example, advertisers and retailers depending on search engines or online marketplaces may benefit from rules limiting self-preferencing and improving data access, and app developers may be affected by changes to app store terms and interoperability requirements.

Both regimes seek to curb the influence of the largest digital platforms and promote fairer competition but do so in different ways. This article compares the DMA and the DMCCA, looking at which companies are covered, how they are designated, the obligations imposed on them, and the enforcement powers available to regulators, and considers what this means in practice for businesses operating in the EU and the UK.

Policy objective and regulatory model

Both regimes seek to address the limits of traditional competition enforcement in fast-moving digital markets, but adopt different philosophies.

 

DMA	DMCCA
A harmonised, rules-based regime imposing a fixed set of obligations on designated “gatekeepers”, regardless of case-specific effects.	Establishes a discretionary regime allowing the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to impose tailored interventions on firms designated with Strategic Market Status (SMS).
Emphasis on legal certainty and uniformity across the EU internal market.	Focus on flexibility and proportionality.
Enforced centrally by the European Commission.	Enforced by the CMA.
National competition authorities may assist and open investigations but do not enforce directly.	Remedies are designed and applied on a case‑by‑case basis.

 

Who is regulated:

1. EU – Gatekeepers

Firms are designated as gatekeepers where they:

• provide a “core platform service” (CPS). CPSs include:
• online intermediation services (e.g. market places and app stores);
• online search engines;
• online social networking services;
• video-sharing platform services;
• number-independent interpersonal communications services;
• operating systems;
• web browsers;
• virtual assistants;
• cloud computing services; and
• online advertising services provided by an undertaking that provides any other CPS.
• Satisfy the three criteria under Article 3(1) DMA: significant impact on the internal market; provides a CPS that is as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and holding an entrenched and durable position, or foreseeable that they will do so in the near future.

Rebuttable presumptions arise where a firm has EU turnover of at least €7.5 billion (or market capitalisation of at least €75 billion), at least 45 million monthly active end users and 10,000 annual business users

The Commission may also designate gatekeepers on qualitative grounds following a market investigation of up to 12 months.

Designation by the Commission is required before any DMA obligations apply.

1. UK – SMA Firms:

SMS designation under the DMCCA is more discretionary and involves a multi-stage assessment.

The firm must:

• carry on a “digital activity” (which does not need to be for profit) with a UK link (assessed flexibly, with no fixed thresholds);
• exceed turnover thresholds (firm or group global turnover over £25 billion or UK turnover over £1 billion);
• demonstrate substantial and entrenched market power assessed by a forward-looking assessment over a period of at least five years; and
• have a position of “strategic significance”, meaning that, for example, it has significant scale, that other firms depend on it, or that it can extend its power to adjacent markets or substantially influence how others conduct themselves.

Nature of obligations:

Aspect	DMA (EU)	DMCCA (UK)
Type of obligations	Fixed list of “do’s and don’ts” set out in the legislation	Customised conduct requirements set by the CMA
Applicability	Automatically applies once gatekeeper is designated	Imposed only after SMS designation and consultation
Regulatory style	Rules‑based and prescriptive	Principles‑based and adaptive

 

Under the DMA, more than 20 directly applicable obligations and prohibitions apply automatically upon designation. These include bans on self-preferencing, restrictions on combining personal data across services, interoperability requirements, and obligations to allow alternative app stores and payment mechanisms.

Under the DMCCA, the CMA may impose customised conduct requirements aligned with three statutory objectives:

• fair dealing (users treated fairly and on reasonable terms);
• open choices (freedom to choose between the SMS firm’s services and those of competitors); and
• trust and transparency (users having the information needed to make informed decisions).

Requirements must be proportionate and may address existing or anticipated conduct.

Conclusions

The DMA and DMCCA pursue broadly similar objectives but reflect different regulatory philosophies. The DMA prioritises legal certainty and harmonisation through a fixed, rules‑based framework that applies uniformly across the EU. By contrast, the DMCCA grants the CMA greater discretion, allowing it to develop tailored, activity‑specific interventions responding to identified concerns in UK digital markets. The ongoing investigations by both regulators into Apple and Google demonstrate that, despite these divergences, they target the same markets, concerns and actors.

For businesses operating across both jurisdictions, this creates a complex compliance landscape. EU-designated gatekeepers face a clear but inflexible set of obligations; UK SMS firms may face less predictable but potentially more nuanced requirements evolving over a five-year designation period.

For businesses operating across both jurisdictions, these differences are not just technical. They may affect how companies access customers, use data and negotiate terms with major platforms.  Early engagement with regulators and adaptable compliance frameworks will therefore be critical to managing regulatory risk in an increasingly interventionist digital competition environment.

If you require any guidance on compliance with the DMA and / or the DMCCA, please contact Paul Henty or Charlie Bayliss.

This article includes additional commentary from Nicholas Kenny.

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