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AI in Litigation and Contempt of Court- Your Home Partners v Kellichan and Hood [2026]

April 2026
Lucy Muir and Daisy Sewell

The recent Sherrif Court decision of Your Home Partners v Michael William Kellichan and Michelle Hood [2026] SC KDY 34 has highlighted the risks of “reckless reliance” on Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) in litigation. The sheriff has issued a strong warning that failure to properly verify AI-assisted outputs may amount to a contempt of court.

The facts in brief

Your Home Partners (the “claimant”), a landlord, raised a simple procedure claim seeking payment of rent arrears of £5,000 from its former tenants. The sheriff rejected the action at the outset, on the basis that the claim fell under the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal (Housing and Property Chamber) (“FtT”). The claimant disagreed, submitting that they understood the sheriff court to be the correct forum, referring to tribunal decisions and other legal authority to support their submissions.

As the claimant purported to have contrary legal references, the sheriff considered that they were entitled to address the court.

The sheriff therefore assigned a discussion and ordered the claimant to lodge a copy of the referenced FtT decisions alongside copies of section 41A of the Small Claims (Scotland) Rules and section 1 of the Interest on Debts (Scotland) Act 1985, having been unable to locate these authorities. The claimant subsequently lodged what they claimed to be extracts from both.

At the discussion, the claimant was informed by the sheriff that both the FtT decisions and the purported rules and statute did not appear to exist. The claimant accepted this and indicated that they had obtained the legal authority using AI, stating that they had unknowingly lodged references to “non-existent decisions, rules and a statute”. Accordingly, the claimant indicated they no longer intended to rely on the FtT decisions, the rules or legislation for the purposes of the discussion.

The Court’s approach

The sheriff considered whether contempt of court proceedings were required, noting that “the lodging of false references had the potential to obstruct justice”, as the discussion would not have been assigned but for the claimant’s insistence that supportive authorities existed.

Ultimately, the sheriff was satisfied that the claimant and its individual partners as lay persons had not knowingly wasted court time or misled the court. On the basis that the claimant and its individual partners as lay persons “had acted in good faith and essentially withdrawn the non-existent references prior to the discussion”, the sheriff held that their conduct did not pass the relevant threshold to constitute a contempt of court. This meant that contempt proceedings were not required.

The sheriff did however criticise the claimant’s failure to verify the accuracy of the AI-generated material before lodging submissions, noting “a degree of recklessness” in this regard. The sheriff highlighted, with reference to R(Ayinde) v Haringey LBC (DC) [2025] 1 WLR 5147, that those using AI to conduct legal research have a duty to check the accuracy of any results with regard to authoritative sources.

The claim was ultimately dismissed and directed to the specialist FtT, the sheriff court lacking both jurisdiction and competence to grant the order sought.

Key takeaways

  • AI cannot replace professional legal advice. This case highlights the risks of unverified reliance on AI in the course of litigation, and that even good-faith errors may expose parties to findings of contempt of court.
  • The accuracy of any legal research conducted by AI should be properly checked with reference to authoritative sources before referred to in the course of litigation.
  • The use of AI in litigation does not transfer liability for any errors to the AI platform; responsibility remains with the solicitor or party litigant using it.

Beale & Co have extensive experience advising on complex professional negligence claims. If you have any questions regarding the issues covered in this article or wish to understand how these apply to your contracts or business practices, please contact Lucy Muir and Daisy Sewell.

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